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We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent prob-
ability 0 < p  1 of participating. A unique symmetric equilibrium is found for any n and
p and its properties are analyzed. In particular, we show that for a xed n > 2 individ-
ual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satises a single-crossing
property for any two dierent numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium
spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We also demonstrate that ex-post over-
dissipation is a feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium in our model. It turns out that
if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of
participating players or not, then the actual number of participants is always revealed.
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11 Introduction
Contest theory, which started from Tullock's famous paper,1 standardly assumes that the
number of players is xed.2 However, sometimes players do not know the actual number of
players participating in the contest. For example, in many rent-seeking contests an individual
lobbyist does not know how many other lobbyists are competing for the rent when she exerts
her eort.3 In this paper, we consider Tullock's n-player contest where each player has an
independent probability 0 < p  1 of participation.
We show that such contests have a unique symmetric equilibrium which can be described
in closed form. We analyze properties of this equilibrium and compare individual and total
equilibrium spending in the standard Tullock model and in our case. Note that the standard
Tullock model is a special case of our model where the participation probability is one (i.e.
p = 1). Individual equilibrium spending, X(r;V;n;p), depends on four parameters: the
marginal return, the prize value, the number of potential players, and the probability of
participation. It turns out that individual equilibrium spending is strictly increasing in the
marginal return and the value of the prize for any xed n and p. Therefore, total equilibrium
spending is also strictly increasing in the same parameters. These observations are, of course,
consistent with the standard Tullock model where p = 1.
We show that individual equilibrium spending as a function of the participation probabil-
ity p is single-peaked. Moreover, for any number of potential players n, the unique positive
probability which maximizes individual equilibrium spending is always strictly less than one.
Therefore, each active player spends more under some uncertainty about the number of players
than under certainty. There are several reasons why it is important to know about individual
equilibrium spending. Sometimes the contest outcome depends solely on the winner's individ-
ual spending. In many R&D races, for instance, losing rms end up with no right to produce
so their eort and investments are socially wasteful. In this case, total spending is not impor-
tant but the individual spending made by the winning rm is. Our analysis suggests that it
can be benecial for society to have some degree of uncertainty in this case.
We also demonstrate that a single-crossing property4 holds for individual equilibrium
1Models similar to Tullock's (1980) have been studied in the literature on advertising and rivalry for market
shares. Friedman's (1958) paper is probably one of the rst in the literature.
2Surveys of the contest literature can be found in Nitzan (1994), Szymanski (2003), Congleton, et al. (2007),
and Konrad (2007).
3The same situation often takes place in R&D races when rms do not know the actual number of R&D
race competitors. Another example is a standard lottery where one player wins a unique main prize. Typically,
when players buy lottery tickets they do not know the actual number of players.
4This property is dierent from the Spence's single crossing condition that has an important role in signaling,
contract theory, and mechanism design.
2spending: for a xed marginal return and a prize value, any two individual equilibrium spend-
ing curves (as functions of p) with dierent potential numbers of players cross only once. This
property is surprising and important. First, the single-crossing property helps to identify the
unique probability which maximizes individual equilibrium spending: We prove that two ad-
jacent individual equilibrium spending curves cross at the peaked point of the curve with a
higher number of potential players. Second, based on the single-crossing property, we show
that the interval of participation probabilities is divided into two parts. If p > 0:9, then the
standard contest result that individual equilibrium spending is decreasing in the number of
participating players holds. However, if 0 < p < 0:9, then the above result does not hold.
It turns out that the comparative statics are much simpler for total equilibrium spending
than individual equilibrium spending. Although individual equilibrium spending is strictly
increasing in only two out of four parameters, total equilibrium spending is strictly increasing
in all four parameters. In particular, unlike individual equilibrium spending, ex-ante total
equilibrium spending (as a function of probability p) is maximized under certainty when
p = 1.
Our model provides another possible answer for a long-standing question about over-
dissipation in equilibrium. Since Krueger (1974), Posner (1975), and Tullock (1980), there
have been many attempts including Corcoran (1984), Corcoran and Karels (1985), Higgins, et
al.(1985), Michaels (1988), and Leininger and Yang (1994) to explain over-dissipation within
a theoretical framework. Now it is a well-known result that ex-ante over-dissipation is not
consistent with equilibrium behavior.5 Ex-ante over-dissipation never takes place in our model
either. Since total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p, the highest expected
(ex-ante) total spending is achieved in Tullock's case p = 1.
Hillman and Samet (1987) and Baye, et al. (1994, 1999) show that ex-post over-dissipation
can take place as a particular realization of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We demonstrate that
ex-post over-dissipation is a natural feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium if the number of
players is stochastic. The intuition for this observation is straightforward. If the participation
probability is below one, p < 1, the actual number of players in the contest can be dierent
from the expected number of players. We demonstrate that if n > 3 and the actual number
of players is much higher than the expected number of players, then ex-post over-dissipation
occurs. However, the expected number of players always coincides with the actual number of
players if p = 1 and, therefore, ex-post over-dissipation never takes place in that case.
Games with an uncertain or stochastic number of players are a natural extension of games
5Recently, Baharad and Nitzan (2008) have shown that over-dissipation is possible in equilibrium, when the
contestants distort their winning probabilities.
3with a xed number of players. In auction theory, McAfee and McMillan (1987) were the
rst to study models with a stochastic number of bidders. They show that standard auc-
tion theory is sensitive to the assumption that the number of players is common knowledge.
Levin and Smith (1994) consider auctions with stochastic entrants resulting from endogenous
entry. They extend the revenue-equivalence and ranking theorems and show that the seller
and society can benet from policies that reduce market thickness. Levin and Ozdenoren
(2004) investigate bidders' and sellers' responses to ambiguity about the number of bidders in
standard auctions with independent private valuations. They show that the general revenue
equivalence result breaks down under ambiguity about the number of bidders. Myerson (1998)
develops a mathematical framework to analyze games with population uncertainty and shows
special properties of Poisson games.6
Myerson and W arneryd (2006) and M unster (2006) are the rst to consider contests with
a stochastic number of players. Myerson and W arneryd (2006) analyze a model with innitely
many potential players where the number of players is a random variable. They show that
if it is known for certain that there will be at least one participant, then total equilibrium
spending is strictly lower in a contest with population uncertainty than in a non-uncertain
contest with the same expected number of players. In our model, the number of players is a
random variable which follows the binomial distribution. Even though we do not require that
there has to be at least one participant in the contest, we are also able to demonstrate the same
result as in Myerson and W arneryd (2006). M unster (2006) considers a model similar to ours.
However, he focuses on the players' risk attitudes and shows that equilibrium rent seeking
eorts are lower under risk aversion if and only if the expected fraction of active contestants
is low.
Finally, we analyze a situation when the contest designer privately learns the actual number
of players in the contest. It turns out that ex-ante the contest designer and the players are
indierent whether the information about the actual number of participants is revealed or not.
Moreover, if the contest designer can strategically reveal his private information, the number
of actual players is always revealed in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the model
and describe the unique symmetric equilibrium. We focus on the properties of individual
equilibrium spending in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the properties of total equilibrium
spending. Information revelation about the actual number of players is analyzed in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6. All proofs are in the Appendix.
6In a Poisson game, the number of players is a random variable which follows the Poisson distribution.
42 The Model
Consider a contest with n potential risk neutral players. We assume that each potential player
participates (becomes active) in the contest with an independent probability p 2 (0;1]. All
active players compete for a single prize of value V . The timing of the game is as follows. First,
nature chooses the active players. Then, without knowing the actual number of participants,
each active player i makes an expenditure, denoted by Xi  0. The winner of the contest is
















where r > 0, M is the set of active players in the contest, and jMj denotes the cardinality of










A   Xi; (2)
where Ni is the set of player i's possible opponents and PNi is the set of all subsets of Ni.

















A   1 = 0: (3)
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where X1 = ::: = Xn = X. Then, the rst order
condition (3) becomes









Note that there are Cn 1
jMj dierent ways to make a set which has exactly jMj elements from
the set Ni. Using this fact, we can rewrite the individual spending (4) as follows
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Now we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. Suppose that 0 < r  n+1
n . Then, there exists a unique symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium where each player's expenditure is











5It is easy to see now that the original Tullock model is a special case of our model where
all players participate in the contest with probability 1. Thus, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Tullock's individual spending). If 0 < r  n+1





In this section we examine the impact of each parameter on individual equilibrium spending,
X(r;V;n;p), and show that p and n have non-monotonic eects on individual equilibrium
spending.
First, we consider marginal return, r, and prize value, V . It is straightforward to see from
(5) that individual equilibrium spending is strictly increasing in both r and V . This means
that Tullock's (p = 1) nding that individual equilibrium spending is a strictly increasing
function of marginal return and prize value is robust to introducing a stochastic number of
players.
Consider next the remaining parameters, the number of players, n, and the participation
probability, p. Note that if there are only two potential players, then individual equilibrium





However, our next example demonstrates that individual equilibrium spending is not mono-
tonic in the probability of participation for n  3.
Example 1. Suppose that n = 3 and r = V = 1. Then
X(1;1;3;0:8) = 0:222 < X(1;1;3;0:9) = 0:225 > X(1;1;3;1) = 0:222:
This example shows that individual equilibrium spending can be higher if there is some degree
of uncertainty (p < 1) than under certainty (p = 1). The following theorem demonstrates that
this observation is true in general: individual equilibrium spending is single-peaked in p.
Theorem 2 (Single-Peaked Property). For any n  3, there exists a unique p(n) 2 (0;1) that
maximizes individual equilibrium spending. Moreover, for given r, V , and n, X(r;V;n;p) is
single-peaked in p.
6In order to see the intuition behind this property, consider individual equilibrium spending,








where x(r;V;i) = i 1
i2 rV is individual equilibrium spending in the contest with i actual players
and q(i;p) = Cn 1
i pi(1   p)n i 1 is the probability that an active player faces exactly i
opponents in the contest (there are i + 1 players in the contest). In other words, individual
equilibrium spending, (8), is a weighted average of individual equilibrium spending in the case
of 1;2;3;:::;n actual players, where the corresponding weight represents the binomial density
assigned to the number of actual opponents of the active player. Note that if an active player
faces zero opponents, then she is the only player in the contest and her equilibrium spending
is zero (see the success function (1)). Moreover, it is a well-known result that individual
equilibrium spending decreases (if i  2) in the number of players in the contest without
uncertainty. Therefore,
x(r;V;2) > x(r;V;3) > ::: > x(r;V;n   1) > x(r;V;n) > x(r;V;1) = 0: (9)
Note that if p is very small (very close to zero) in (8), then most of the weight is given to the
rst coecient, x(r;V;1) = 0, so that individual equilibrium spending is also very small. Now
if p increases, most of the weight shifts from the rst to the second coecient x(r;V;2) and
individual equilibrium spending increases. Finally, if p increases more, most of the weight shifts
from the second coecient to coecients three, four and so on. Since the second coecient is
the biggest among all the coecients, individual equilibrium spending will decrease.7 Figure








































Figure 1: (a) small p (b) p = p (c) large p
7Note that the very last eect is absent if n = 2. Hence, individual equilibrium spending is monotonically
increasing in p if n = 2.
8Note that r and V are chosen such that x(r;V;1) + x(r;V;2) + x(r;V;3) + x(r;V;4) = 1.
7The Single-Peak Property means that for any given n there exists a unique participation
probability, denoted by p(n), that maximizes individual equilibrium spending. How will
this probability change if n increases? In order to investigate that, we need to understand
the relationship between two dierent individual spending curves with dierent numbers of
potential players. The following identity demonstrates the connection between two adjacent
individual spending curves.
Theorem 3. Suppose that n  3, then




Since the right-hand side of (10) can be equal to zero only at p(n) from the single-peak
property, the individual equilibrium spending curves X(r;V;n;p) and X(r;V;n   1;p) can
only intersect once if p 2 (0;1). Moreover, the intersection point must be the peak point of
the curve X(r;V;n;p). This gives the following corollary:
Corollary 2. For all n  2, curve X(r;V;n;p) intersects curve X(r;V;n+1;p) at the peak
point of X(r;V;n + 1;p).
The following theorem states even stronger results that p(n) and X(r;V;n;p(n)) de-
crease as n increases. These results are derived directly from the single-peak property and
identity (10).
Theorem 4. Suppose that r and V are given. Then,
i) p(n) strictly decreases as n increases;
ii) X(r;V;n;p(n)) strictly decreases as n increases.
Let us examine how individual equilibrium spending changes if n increases. In the original
Tullock (1980) model, individual equilibrium spending is a strictly decreasing function of the
number of players. However, the following example shows that this is not the case under
uncertainty.
Example 2. Suppose that p = 0:8 and r = V = 1. Then
X(1;1;2;0:8) = 0:2 < X(1;1;3;0:8) = 0:2222 > X(1;1;4;0:8) = 0:2053:9
When do we have a non-monotonic relationship between n and individual equilibrium
spending? Does the presence of some degree of participation uncertainty always guarantee
this non-monotonicity? To answer these questions, we rst show that any two individual
equilibrium spending curves with dierent number of potential players cross only once on the
interval p 2 (0;1].
9M unster (2006) also points this possibility out.
8Theorem 5 (Single-Crossing Property). For any 2  m < n, there exists a unique p(m;n) 2
(0;1] such that
X(r;V;m;p(m;n)) = X(r;V;n;p(m;n)): (11)
The intuition for the single-crossing property is as follows. Consider two dierent numbers
of potential players 2  m < n. If p is very small (very close to zero) in (8), most of the weight,
(1 p)m 1 and (1 p)n 1, is given to the rst coecient, x(r;V;1) = 0, in the weighted average.
Since 2  m < n, individual equilibrium spending is higher for n potential players (it puts
less weight on the rst coecient). If p is very close to one, individual equilibrium spending
in our model becomes very close to what it would be in Tullock's model and hence is higher
for m potential players. Since individual equilibrium spending is continuous in p, it has to be
a \crossing" point for two individual equilibrium spending curves with dierent numbers of
potential players. Theorem 5 shows that such a crossing point is unique.
Theorems 4 and 5 demonstrate that the individual equilibrium spending curves do not
intersect to the right of p(3). This implies that we observe the non-monotonic relationship
between n and individual equilibrium spending if and only if the participation probability is
smaller than p(3) = 0:9.
Corollary 3. Suppose that r and V are given. Then the individual equilibrium spending,
X(r;V;n;p), is monotonically decreasing in n if and only if 0:9 < p  1.
Corollary 3 describes the whole range of p where Tullock's monotonicity result holds:
more players lead to less individual spending. The intuition behind this result is as follows:
Since there is monotonicity in the extreme case p = 1 and individual equilibrium spending
is continuous in the parameter p, monotonicity should hold in some neighborhood of the
Tullock's model. Corollary 3 describes this neighborhood. Note that (from the single-crossing
property) if p is smaller than p(3) = 0:9 (the crossing point of the individual spending curves
with n = 2 and n = 3), individual spending with three potential players is higher than the
individual spending with two potential players. This means that monotonicity no longer holds
when p < 0:9. All results of this section are summarized in Figure 3.
4 Total Spending
In this section, we examine the impact of each parameter on total equilibrium spending. Even
though in the previous section we showed that individual equilibrium spending is not mono-
tonic in p and n, here we demonstrate that total equilibrium spending is indeed monotonic
in all parameters. Next, we show that ex-post over-dissipation can occur. Finally, we discuss


















Figure 2: Equilibrium individual spending when rV = 1.
4.1 Properties




n 1pn 1(1   p)(n   1) + ::: + Cn
1 p(1   p)n 11 = np: (12)
Note that the expected number of players is the same as an expectation of the random variable
that follows a binomial distribution B(n;p) where the probability of success is p and the
number of trials is n.
The expected total equilibrium spending is













From equation (13), it is straightforward to see that the total spending increases as either V
or r increases.
Consider now how a participation probability and the number of potential players aect
total equilibrium spending. We will only discuss the eect of the participation probability
here. Similar reasoning can be applied to the number of potential players. From Theorem 2,
it is clear that for a small p < p(n) the expected number of players and individual equilibrium
spending will both increase if p increases. Therefore, total equilibrium spending will increase
too. However, if p  p(n), then an increase of p has two dierent eects on the expected total
equilibrium spending. First, it always increases the expected number of players (see equation















Figure 3: Expected total equilibrium spending. rV = 1.
stronger as p increases. In the extreme case when p = 1 the second eect reaches its peak.
However, as is well-known in the literature, even in this case the rst eect is stronger. The
following theorem states this formally.
Theorem 6. Suppose that r and V are given. Then,
i) for any n  2, the expected total equilibrium spending increases as p increases;
ii) for any p 2 (0;1], the expected total equilibrium spending increases as n increases.
Figure 3 illustrates Theorem 6.
4.2 Over-dissipation
In this subsection, we show that if the actual number of players in the contest is \much higher"
than the expected number of players, then ex-post over-dissipation can occur.
The possibility of ex-post over-dissipation is reminiscent of a similar observation in auction
literature. For example, Levin and Smith (Proposition 3, 1994) study auctions with stochastic
entrants and show that entry would be excessive from social and private points of view in the
common-value auction.
Denote RT(r;V;n;p;k) as actual total spending, where k is the actual number of players.
Then in the symmetric equilibrium,
RT(r;V;n;p;k) = k  X(r;V;n;p):
Ex-post over-dissipation takes place if and only if actual total spending exceeds the prize value,
11V . That is,
RT(r;V;n;p;k) = k  X(r;V;n;p) > V: (14)
From (14) and (5), it follows that ex-post over-dissipation occurs if









It is clear from (15) that ex-post over-dissipation never happens if the critical number k is
greater than the number of potential players k  n. This happens for small numbers of
potential players, n = 2;3. For example, if n = 3, we get
V > 0:9V = RT(4=3;V;3;0:9;3)  RT(r;V;3;p;k); for all r 2 (0;4=3] and p 2 (0;1]:
The smallest number of potential players when ex-post over-dissipation is possible is 4:
RT(5=4;V;4;2=3;4)  1:049V > V:
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate ex-post under-dissipation in the case of n = 3 and ex-post over-


























Figure 4: (a) realized total spending when n = 3 (b) realized total spending when n = 10
dissipation in the case of n = 10. We can see (Figures 4b) that ex-post over-dissipation can
occur if k  6. Moreover, the range of p where ex-post over-dissipation can occur becomes
wider as k increases.
It is important to note that ex-post over-dissipation never takes place in the certain world
because the actual number of players is the same as the expected number of players in this
case. Therefore, some uncertainty must be present in order to have ex-post over-dissipation.
This intuition is similar to the idea behind Baye, et al. (1994, 1999) who show that ex-post
over-dissipation can take place as a particular realization of a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We
summarize this subsection with the following theorem.
12Theorem 7. Ex-post over-dissipation takes place if and only if condition (15) holds. Moreover,
if n = 2 or 3, ex-post over-dissipation never occurs; for any n  4 there exist p 2 (0;1) and
r 2 (0; n+1
n ] such that ex-post over-dissipation is possible.
4.3 The same expected number of players
In this subsection, we x the expected number of players, n = np, and compare total equi-
librium spending across the total-equilibrium-spending curves in Figure 3. In particular, we
are interested in comparing total equilibrium spending when p = 1 and n = n, T(r;V;n;1),
with 0 < p = n
n < 1 and n > n, T(r;V;n; n
n). Note that the expected number of players is
the same in both cases.


























The following theorem presents the main result of this subsection that total equilibrium spend-
ing is strictly lower in any uncertain case in comparison with the certain case.





for any n > n.
Theorem 8 shows that uncertainty about the actual number of players induces lower ex-
ante under-dissipation. This result is consistent with Myerson and W arneryd's (2006) nding
for another distribution of potential players. They consider a contest with innitely many
potential players where the number of players is a random variable with expectation  > 1
and show that total equilibrium spending is strictly lower in such a contest than in a contest
where the number of players is known with certainty to be .
5 Comparing Revealing and Concealing Policies
In this section, we assume that a contest designer knows privately the realized number of
players as it is in Levin and Ozdenoren (2004). Then, the risk-neutral contest designer has
two dierent policies to consider: revealing his private information to the players or concealing
13it. Which policy is better for the contest designer who wants to maximize the expected total
spending (which is equivalent to maximizing the expected individual spending in this case)?
To answer this question, we consider the following two dierent scenarios. First, we assume
that the contest designer can commit to always reveal or conceal the actual number of players
(before he observes the actual number of players). We demonstrates that ex-ante the contest
designer and the players are indierent between whether the information about the actual
number of participants in the contest is revealed or not. Second, we consider a strategic
designer who can choose to either reveal or conceal the actual number of players after he
obtains the information. We show that even if the contest designer can strategically decide
whether to reveal the actual number of participating players or not, the actual number of
participants is always revealed.
5.1 Pre-commitment
Suppose that the contest designer can commit himself to always either reveal or conceal his
private information. Then, we have the following game:
1. The contest designer commits to reveal (subgame R) or conceal (subgame C) his private
information before the contest begins.
2. Nature chooses the number of active players.
3. The designer's commitment is implemented.
4. Active players choose their individual spending.
5. The winner of the game is determined by the contest success function (1).
Note that subgame C has already been considered in Section 2. In subgame R, active
players face Tullock's contest. The following result shows that ex-ante the contest designer
and the players obtain the same expected payos in subgames C and R.
Theorem 9. Ex-ante, both the contest designer and the players are indierent between the
revealing and the concealing policies.
This result follows from the expected utility theorem and the fact that individual equilib-
rium spending is a weighted average of individual equilibrium spending in case of 1;2;3;:::;n
actual players, where the corresponding weights represent the binomial density assigned to
the number of actual players.
5.2 Strategic Designer
What if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of
participating players or not? To investigate this question, we consider the following game:
141. Nature chooses the number of active players.
2. After observing the number of actual players, the contest designer decides either to reveal
(R,i) or conceal (C) it.
3. Active players choose their individual spending.
4. The winner of the game is determined by the contest success function (1).
Note that the contest designer's action at stage 2 depends on the realized actual number
of players. Each player observes either C (subgame C) or (R,i) (subgame (R,i)) and makes
her spending decision. Note that in the subgame (R,i) (the contest designer reveals that the
actual number of players in the contest is i), Tullock's contest takes place and each active
player spends
b X(R;i) = x(r;V;i) =
i   1
i2 rV: (17)
In subgame C, each player updates her belief about the actual number of players according
to Bayes' rule. Denote by f(j + 1;p) the player's posterior belief that there are exactly j
opponents (or j + 1 players including herself) in the contest. The analysis in Section 2 shows






Let us look at the contest designer's decision problem. Given b X(R;i) and b X(C), the contest
designer reveals i if
b X(R;i) > b X(C): (19)
From (9) and (17), the amount of individual spending as a function of the total number of
players in the contest (the subgame (R,i)) can be strictly ranked as follows:
b X(R;2) > b X(R;3) > ::: > b X(R;n   1) > b X(R;n) > b X(R;1) = 0: (20)
Therefore, i = 2 is revealed in the equilibrium because b X(R;2) (the highest individual spend-
ing) is always greater than b X(C), which is a convex combination of some b X(R;i) for i 6= 2.
Since i = 2 is revealed in the equilibrium (the designer chooses subgame (R,2)), there is zero
probability to have two actual players in the contest in subgame C, or f(2;p) = 0. Therefore,
i = 3 should also be revealed in the equilibrium because b X(R;3) is now greater than b X(C),
which is a convex combination of some b X(R;i) for i 6= 2;3. Since i = 3 is revealed in the
equilibrium (the designer chooses the subgame (R,3)), there is zero probability of having three
actual players in the contest in subgame C, or f(3;p) = 0. After applying the same logic to
i = 4;5;::::n recursively, we obtain the following result.
15Lemma 1. There is no symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the contest designer
conceals the number of active players i > 1.
Lemma 1 demonstrates that in any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, either (a) the
actual number of players is always revealed, or (b) only i = 1 is concealed. It is important to
note that concealing i = 1 means that f(1;p) = 1 and f(i;p) = 0 for all i 6= 1. Hence,
Theorem 10. In any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, full revelation takes place for
any p 2 (0;1) and n  2.
The last result is surprising because it demonstrates that the strategic designer cannot
take advantage of his private information about the actual number of players.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider Tullock's n-player contest where each player has an independent
probability of participating. We nd a unique symmetric equilibrium and analyze its proper-
ties. The most important observations are:
1. Even though individual equilibrium spending is not monotonic in the potential number
of players and the participation probability, total equilibrium spending is monotonic in all
parameters.
2. Ex-post over-dissipation is a natural feature of the unique symmetric pure-strategy equi-
librium.
3. If the contest designer can privately learn the actual number of the contest participants,
he will always reveal his private information.
There are several natural extensions of our paper. First, it would be interesting to test our
theory in the experimental lab. In particular, our predictions about single-peak and single-
crossing properties of individual equilibrium spending and monotonicity of total equilibrium
spending should be checked.
Finally, the actual number of players in our contest follows Binomial distribution, B(n;p).
This assumption captures the main source of the population uncertainty that results from
the uncertainty each individual faces. Moreover, it is a well-known result that the binomial
distribution converges towards the Poisson distribution with parameter  = np as n goes to
innity while the product np remains xed.10 In this sense, we analyze a nite version of the
\Poisson contest."
10See, for example, Feller (1968).
16A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. In order to verify that (5) is indeed an equilibrium, we have to check
the second order condition and conrm that individual spending (5) leads to a non-negative
expected payo for each player.






i pi (1   p)




It means that each player prefers to spend (5) instead of nothing, 0, given that each other
player also spends (5). Condition (21) is equivalent to
0 < r 
Pn 1
i=0 Cn 1



































In the symmetric equilibrium, this condition becomes
0 < r 
Pn 1
i=0 Cn 1




i pi(1   p)n i 1 i(i 1)
(i+1)3
: (23)
Note that if 0 < r  n+1
n , then inequalities (22) and (23) always hold.
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@p is a continuous function of p on the interval [0;1], there must exist
an interior p(n) 2 (0;1) such that 1
rV 
@X(r;V;n;p(n))
@p = 0. Now, we shall show that p(n) is
unique.














i2 + i   1
(i + 1)2(i + 2)2

> 0: (26)
It means that G(p;n) is equal to 1=4 only at the unique point p(n). Therefore, there exists
a unique p(n) such that 1
rV 
@X(r;V;n;p(n))
@p = 0. Finally, from equations (24) and (26) it is
clear that if p < p(n) (p > p(n)), then
@X(r;V;n;p)
@p > 0(< 0). This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. From equation (5), we have
X(r;V;n;p)   X(r;V;n   1;p)
rV
=
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Proof of Theorem 4. First, we shall show that p(n) strictly decreases as n increases. From

























i2 + i   1
(i + 1)2(i + 2)2

> 0;
for any p 2 (0;1) and
@G(p;n)
@p > 0, we get
p(n) > p(n + 1); for n  2: (29)
18Second, we shall show that function X(r;V;n;p(n)) strictly decreases as n increases.
From Theorem 3, we have
X(r;V;n;p(n)) = X(r;V;n   1;p(n)): (30)
From (29), it follows that p(n) < p(n 1). By the denition of p(n 1) and its uniqueness,
we get
X(r;V;n   1;p(n   1)) > X(r;V;n   1;p(n)): (31)
Therefore, from (30) and (31)
X(r;V;n   1;p(n   1)) > X(r;V;n;p(n)):
Proof of Theorem 5. First, we show that two curves X(r;V;m;p) and X(r;V;n;p)







From (5) and (6), we have






m2 rV = X(r;V;m;1): (34)
Continuity of X(r;V;n;p) in p together with (32), (33), and (34) provide the existence of an
interior solution of equation (11). Now, we demonstrate that this interior solution is unique.
From Theorem 3, if m = n   1, then there exists a unique interior solution of equation
(11), p(n   1;n) = p(n). It means that for all n > m  2 the following equations have a
unique interior solution
X(r;V;n;p(n)) = X(r;V;n   1;p(n))
and
X(r;V;m;p(m + 1)) = X(r;V;m + 1;p(m + 1)):
Moreover, from Theorem 4
X(r;V;n;p) > X(r;V;n   1;p); if 0 < p < p(n)
19and
X(r;V;n;p) < X(r;V;n   1;p); if p > p(n):
Analogously,
X(r;V;m;p) < X(r;V;m + 1;p); if 0 < p < p(m)
and
X(r;V;m;p) > X(r;V;m + 1;p); if p > p(m):
Since n > m, Theorem 4 gives p(n) < p(m). Therefore,
X(r;V;n;p) > X(r;V;m;p); if 0 < p < p(n)
and
X(r;V;n;p) < X(r;V;m;p); if p > p(m):
Hence, two curves X(r;V;m;p) and X(r;V;n;p) can cross only on the interval p 2 [p(n);p(m)].
Note that function X(r;V;m;p) is strictly increasing and function X(r;V;n;p) is strictly de-
creasing on the interval p 2 [p(n);p(m)]. Therefore, if there exists a solution of equation
(11), it must be unique.
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> 0:
Proof of Theorem 8. From equation (13), we get
T(r;V;n;p) = rV 
 








Note that the function 1
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i pi(1   p)n i)2
n
=
(1   (1   p)n)2
n
: (36)
Combining inequality (36) with equation (35), we obtain
T(r;V;n;p) < rV 

1   (1   p)n  
















rV (1   p)2n
n
:
The last inequality comes from the fact that n  2. This completes the proof.
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